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IS SILENCE STILL GOLDEN? THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS 
ON THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
Brigitte Mills* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins1 chips 
further away at the already tattered principles and protections 
originally announced in the Court’s 1966 landmark decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona.2 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself.”3 In Miranda, the Court found that the 
inherently coercive pressures of in-custody interrogation might 
compel a suspect to violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.4 To help prevent violations of this constitutional right, 
the Miranda Court held that law enforcement officials must apprise 
the suspect of his rights by way of certain warnings.5 These warnings 
are not guaranteed constitutional rights themselves but serve to 
safeguard those eminently important substantive rights6 and are an 
“absolute prerequisite to interrogation.”7 No inculpatory statements 
elicited during a custodial interrogation may be offered against the 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, magna cum laude and Order of the Coif. I 
would like to thank Professor Marcy Strauss for her invaluable guidance and input on this 
comment. I would also like to give my deepest thanks to the entire staff of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review, especially the inimitable Elena Grieco, for her support, patience, and keen 
eye throughout the editing process. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
 2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 5. See id. at 471. These now-famous warnings must inform the suspect that he has the right 
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him, and that he has the right to the 
presence of an attorney during questioning. Id. 
 6. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994). 
 7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. 
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suspect unless the suspect was first advised of his rights.8 
Miranda warnings do more than merely inform suspects of their 
rights. The Miranda Court found that these warnings protect a 
suspect from the “inherently compelling pressures” of interrogation.9 
First, after the warnings have been given, if the suspect “in any 
manner”10 indicates that he wishes to remain silent or that he wishes 
to consult an attorney, all questioning must cease.11 Alternatively, if 
the suspect does not invoke his rights and the interrogation 
continues, the government shoulders a “heavy burden” to show that 
the suspect “knowingly and intelligently” waived his rights.12 
Miranda made clear that “a valid waiver will not be presumed 
simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or 
simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually 
obtained.”13 
The Miranda Court announced these broad principles regarding 
the right against self-incrimination but provided merely a blueprint 
of the right’s scope. In fact, the Miranda Court left the question for a 
future Court to fill in the rule’s precise contours. As discussed below, 
the Court has retreated from the broad principles originally 
announced in Miranda, and the rules that have developed through 
Miranda’s progeny bear little resemblance to the original decision.14 
This Comment discusses the decision in Berghuis v. 
Thompkins15 and the role the decision plays in further diminishing the 
broad protections established in Miranda. Part II provides a summary 
of the factual and procedural background of the Thompkins decision. 
Part III discusses the reasoning of the majority and dissenting 
opinions. Finally, Part IV discusses how the decision’s broad holding 
is a departure from the Court’s precedents and how it greatly 
undermines a suspect’s exercise of his constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. 
 
 8. See id. at 444. 
 9. Id. at 467. 
 10. See id. at 473–74. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 475. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: Conservative 
Judicial Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 813, 832–33. 
 15. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Samuel Morris died from multiple gunshot wounds sustained 
outside a mall in Southfield, Michigan, on January 10, 2000.16 One of 
the suspects, Van Chester Thompkins, fled the scene.17 He was 
arrested in Ohio about one year later.18 Two officers from Michigan 
traveled to Ohio to interrogate Thompkins.19 At the start of the 
interrogation, Detective Christopher Helgert presented Thompkins 
with a form containing the Miranda warning.20 To ensure that he 
could read and understand English, Helgert asked Thompkins to read 
aloud the fifth warning on the form.21 Thompkins complied.22 Helgert 
read the remaining warnings aloud and asked Thompkins to sign the 
form to indicate that he understood his rights.23 Thompkins declined 
to sign the form.24 There is conflicting evidence as to whether 
Thompkins verbally confirmed that he understood his rights.25 
The interrogation took place in a room that was eight feet by ten 
feet.26 Thompkins sat in a chair that resembled a school desk.27 After 
 
 16. Id. at 2256. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. The form stated: 
NOTIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND STATEMENT 
1.  You have the right to remain silent. 
2.  Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
3.  You have a right to talk to a lawyer before answering any questions and you have 
the right to have a lawyer present with you while you are answering any questions. 
4.  If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish one. 
5.  You have the right to decide at any time before or during questioning to use your 
right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you are being 
questioned. 
Id. 
 21. Id.; see supra note 20. 
 22. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Helgert testified at a suppression hearing that he “believe[d] [he] asked [Thompkins] if 
he understood the Rights, and [Helgert thought he] got a verbal answer to that as a ‘yes.’” Id. at 
2267 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). At trial, however, Helgert said, “I don’t know that I orally 
asked” Thompkins whether he understood his rights. Id. 
 26. Id. at 2256 (majority opinion). 
 27. Id. 
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the interrogation began, at no time did Thompkins say that he did not 
want to talk with the police, that he wanted to remain silent, or that 
he wanted to speak with an attorney.28 During the interrogation, the 
officers asked Thompkins numerous questions and conveyed to him 
that this was his opportunity to tell his side of the story.29 Thompkins, 
however, remained largely silent.30 He gave a few limited responses, 
such as “Yeah,” “No,” or “I don’t know,” and occasionally nodded 
his head or made eye contact.31 At one point, he communicated that 
he “didn’t want a peppermint” and that the chair he was “sitting in 
was hard.”32 After about two hours and forty-five minutes, Helgert 
asked Thompkins, “Do you believe in God?”33 Thompkins made eye 
contact with Helgert, and, with tears in his eyes, responded, “Yes.”34 
Helgert then asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting 
that boy down?”35 He responded, “Yes,” and looked away.36 
Thompkins refused to sign a written confession, and the interrogation 
ended approximately fifteen minutes later.37 
Before his jury trial, Thompkins made a motion to suppress the 
statements made during the interrogation under Miranda,38 claiming 
a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.39 
He claimed he had invoked his right to remain silent by actually 
remaining silent, and that in any event, he had not waived that right.40 
The trial court denied the motion.41 The jury subsequently convicted 
Thompkins of first-degree murder.42 
Thompkins appealed the trial court’s refusal to suppress his 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 2267 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 2256 (majority opinion). 
 31. Id. at 2256–57. 
 32. Id. at 2257. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 39. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2258. 
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pretrial statements.43 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
found that while a waiver of the right to remain silent may be 
implied through a “course of conduct indicating waiver,”44 
Thompkins’s “persistent silence for nearly three hours” indicated a 
course of conduct that strongly suggested that Thompkins did not 
waive his right to remain silent.45 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  Majority Opinion 
Under Miranda, for statements made by a suspect during a 
custodial interrogation to be admissible against him at trial, the 
police must give the suspect a warning advising him of his rights.46 
The warning must advise the suspect that he has the right to remain 
silent and the right to the presence of an attorney.47 If at any time 
during the interrogation, the suspect invokes either of these rights—
for example by stating that he wants to speak to an attorney or that he 
does not want to answer questions—the interrogation must cease.48 
However, even if the suspect does not clearly invoke his rights and 
the interrogation continues, any statements made during the 
investigation are inadmissible absent a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of those rights.49 
1.  Whether Thompkins Invoked His Right to Remain Silent 
Thompkins argued that he invoked his right to remain silent by 
not saying anything for a sufficient period of time, and therefore all 
questioning should have ceased.50 In an opinion authored by Justice 
Kennedy, a majority of the Court rejected this argument.51 
The Court acknowledged that when a suspect invokes his right 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
 45. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 588 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2250 
(2010). 
 46. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. 
 50. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010). 
 51. Id. 
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to counsel or his right to remain silent police must “scrupulously 
honor[]” this request by terminating the interrogation.52 In Davis v. 
United States,53 the Court held that a suspect who wishes to invoke 
his right to counsel must do so unambiguously.54 A suspect’s 
ambiguous request for counsel does not trigger his right to cut off 
questioning.55 Furthermore, police officers do not have to ask any 
clarifying questions to determine whether the suspect’s ambiguous 
statement is in fact an attempt to invoke his rights.56 
The Court in Thompkins, for the first time, squarely addressed 
the issue of whether the unambiguous invocation rule from Davis 
applies with equal force to the invocation of the right to remain 
silent.57 The Court in this case, finding no principled reason to adopt 
a different standard, extended the rule in Davis to the right to remain 
silent.58 Therefore, unless the suspect unambiguously invokes his 
right to remain silent by clearly saying either that he does not want to 
talk to the police or that he wants to remain silent, the police are not 
required to cut off questioning.59 
A rule requiring an unambiguous invocation of the right to 
remain silent, the Court reasoned, presents the police with clear 
guidance as to whether it is proper to proceed with an interrogation.60 
If the rule were otherwise, it would require the police to make 
difficult decisions regarding whether the suspect had invoked his 
rights, and a suspect’s voluntary confession could potentially be 
suppressed “if they guess wrong.”61 This hypothetical result, the 
Court concluded, would place a “significant burden on society’s 
interest in prosecuting criminal activity.”62 
Thompkins did not make any clear statements to the police that 
 
 52. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). 
 53. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
 54. Id. at 459. 
 55. Id. (finding that suspect’s statement “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” did not constitute 
an unambiguous invocation of right to counsel). 
 56. Id. at 461–62. 
 57. Berguis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (quoting Davis, 540 U.S. at 461) (citations omitted). 
 62. Id. 
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he wished to remain silent.63 Therefore, Thompkins did not invoke 
his right to remain silent, and the police were not required to cut off 
questioning.64 
2.  Whether Thompkins Waived His Right to Remain Silent 
Even if Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent his 
statements could not be used against him unless he “knowingly and 
voluntarily waived” his rights.65 “The question of whether a suspect 
has validly waived his right is ‘entirely distinct’ as a matter of law 
from whether he invoked that right.”66 Therefore, finding that 
Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent, the Court turned 
its analysis to whether he had validly waived that right. 
The prosecution bears a “heavy burden” to show the suspect 
waived his rights.67 However, it need not show that he expressly 
waived his rights either orally or in writing.68 In North Carolina v. 
Butler,69 the Court made it clear that waiver of the right to remain 
silent may be implied through “the defendant’s silence, coupled with 
an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating 
waiver.”70 Because Thompkins did not expressly waive his rights in 
writing or orally, the Court analyzed whether he had impliedly 
waived them. 
Relying on Butler’s implied-waiver rule, the Court held that if 
the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning had been given, that 
the suspect had understood his rights, and that he had made 
incriminating, uncoerced statements, he had impliedly waived his 
right to remain silent.71 According to the Court, this rule sufficiently 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). 
 66. Id. at 2268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) 
(per curiam)). 
 67. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 168 (1986) (construing “heavy burden” to require no more than a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard). 
 68. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. 
 69. 441 U.S. 369. 
 70. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373). 
 71. Id. at 2262 (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it 
was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes implied waiver of 
the right to remain silent.”). 
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guarantees that a suspect “knowingly and voluntarily” waived his 
rights.72 The majority reasoned that “[a]s a general proposition, the 
law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of 
his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has 
made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights 
afford.”73 As long as the prosecution can show that the suspect had 
been advised that he had the right to remain silent and that he had 
understood that right, the fact that he had spoken at all demonstrated 
a deliberate choice to give up the right to remain silent. His actions 
therefore constituted a “course of conduct indicating waiver.”74 
Applying this rule to the facts on the record, the Court held that 
Thompkins had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.75 The 
Court found that there was no evidence that Thompkins had not 
understood his rights, and he therefore had known what he was 
giving up by speaking.76 In addition, the Court found that 
Thompkins’s response to Helgert’s questions about whether he 
prayed to God for forgiveness for shooting the victim, coupled with 
the sporadic answers he had given throughout the interview, 
constituted a “course of conduct indicating waiver.”77 Therefore, 
Thompkins’s inculpatory responses were admissible at trial. 
B.  Dissent 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, dissented. The dissent addressed the issue of waiver first. 
Emphasizing the prosecution’s heavy burden to prove waiver, it 
found that the state had not met that burden.78 The dissent centered 
its argument on the principle announced in Miranda and affirmed in 
Butler, that “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the 
silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the 
fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”79 The dissent 
 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 2263. 
 75. Id. at 2262. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 2263 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). 
 78. Id. at 2268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 2269; Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
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concluded that these precedents clearly favored a finding that the 
prosecution had not met its “heavy burden” to prove Thompkins had 
waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination.80 
The dissent criticized the majority’s opinion as flatly 
contradicting the long-standing precedent that waiver must not be 
presumed simply because a confession was eventually obtained.81 It 
viewed the opinion as announcing an unnecessarily broad new 
principle of law that “an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes 
an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”82 This decision, 
according to the dissent, takes an “unprecedented step away” from 
the high standards of proof required to prove waiver of constitutional 
rights.83 Furthermore, the decision undermines the important interest 
in preventing a coercive and inquisitorial criminal justice system 
against which the Miranda warnings were designed to protect.84 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s new rule 
requiring a suspect to clearly assert his right to silence.85 The dissent 
found the majority’s decision to extend the unambiguous invocation 
rule from Davis particularly problematic in light of the lessened 
burden on the prosecution to show waiver.86 Taken together, the new 
implied-waiver rule and the “novel clear-statement rule for 
invocation invite[] police to question a suspect at length—
notwithstanding his persistent refusal to answer questions—in the 
hope of eventually obtaining a single inculpatory response which 
will suffice to prove waiver of rights.”87 
Instead of extending this unambiguous assertion rule to the right 
to remain silent, the dissent would have applied a more precautionary 
and fact-specific standard, set forth in Michigan v. Mosley88 that 
requires that a suspect’s “right to cut off questioning” has been 
“scrupulously honored.”89 This standard, the dissent argues, would 
 
 80. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2273. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
 89. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 
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accommodate a fact-specific scenario in which a suspect’s silence 
could be interpreted differently under different circumstances.90 On 
the other hand, a suspect’s silence throughout a prolonged 
interrogation should not be understood as anything other than an 
invocation of the right to remain silent, and under such 
circumstances the police would be required to terminate the 
interrogation.91 This standard, the dissent argues, is the more faithful 
application of the Court’s precedents than the majority’s 
unnecessarily broad extension of Davis.92 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Requiring an Unambiguous Assertion of the Right to Remain 
Silent Undermines the Suspect’s Ability to Effectively Assert 
His Rights During Intimidating Interrogations 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Thompkins, nine of eleven circuit 
courts had either already required that a suspect unambiguously 
assert his right to remain silent or had held that such a requirement 
would not be an unreasonable application of federal law. However, 
the decision in Thompkins represents the first time the Supreme 
Court itself squarely addressed the issue. The Court held that a 
suspect only invokes his right to remain silent by making an 
unambiguous statement to that effect.93 With this decision, the Court 
set a new lower constitutional floor for the protection against self-
incrimination. 
The question of whether a suspect has invoked his right to 
remain silent is significant because once a suspect has invoked that 
right the police must “scrupulously honor[]” that request by 
immediately ceasing the interrogation.94 However, unless or until the 
suspect invokes his rights, the police may continue with the 
interrogation unimpeded.95 
 
104). 
 90. Id. at 2275–76. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2278. 
 93. Id. at 2260 (majority opinion). 
 94. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103–04 (1975) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 
(1966)). 
 95. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994). 
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While the Miranda Court held that a suspect may assert his right 
to remain silent and his right to counsel “in any manner,”96 the Court 
subsequently retreated from this position in Davis.97 That case, which 
specifically addressed only the invocation of the right to counsel, 
held that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel for police 
questioning to cease.98 After Davis, anything short of a clear 
statement expressing the desire for the assistance of counsel will not 
be honored.99 The statement found to be ambiguous in Davis was 
“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”100 The Davis Court further held 
that while it may be good police practice, the interrogating officer is 
under no obligation to clarify whether the suspect actually wants an 
attorney.101 Therefore, it is of some moment that the Court in 
Thompkins unequivocally decided to extend this requirement of 
unambiguous invocation to the right to remain silent. 
The application of the Davis requirement to the right to remain 
silent may not seem particularly problematic under the facts of 
Thompkins. Indeed, the suspect made no affirmative statement 
indicating that he did not want to speak with the police; he merely 
remained largely silent, gave intermittent one-word answers, 
occasionally nodded his head, and sometimes made eye contact.102 It 
may therefore seem proper, in the interest of effective law 
enforcement, to allow an interrogation to continue absent a clear 
indication that a suspect does not wish to speak with the police. 
However, there are several types of statements that could be 
construed as ambiguous that likely reflect a suspect’s ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to assert his right to remain silent.103 For 
example, suspects often make statements such as “I might not want 
to talk,”104 or “I don’t want to talk now.”105 When a suspect makes 
 
 96. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45. 
 97. 512 U.S. 452. 
 98. Id. at 459. 
 99. See id. at 461–62. 
 100. Id. at 455. 
 101. Id. at 461–62. 
 102. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256–57 (2010). 
 103. See Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to 
Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 787–88 (2009) (listing eight 
different categories of statements that could constitute an “ambiguous” assertion of the right to 
remain silent). 
 104. Id. at 789. 
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these types of uncertain, ambiguous statements, it is “at least as 
plausible, if not more plausible, that [the] suspect . . . is, albeit 
imperfectly, attempting to invoke one or more rights.”106 
Furthermore, by extension from Davis, interrogators will be at liberty 
to completely ignore any ambiguous indication of a desire to remain 
silent and will have no obligation to clarify whether the suspect 
wishes to speak.107 
The Miranda Court was concerned with the “inherently 
compelling pressures” of the in-custody interrogation when it 
announced its prophylactic rule.108 However, it is exactly those 
pressures at work that make the unambiguous-assertion requirement 
so problematic. Faced with the intimidating specter of police 
interrogation, a suspect may falter in his language and fail to 
unambiguously assert his desire to remain silent. Furthermore, the 
intimidated suspect’s uncertain statement may be completely ignored 
by the interrogators, further contributing to the imbalance of power 
in the interrogation room. 
B.  The Court’s New Rule Regarding Implied Waiver 
Is a Striking Departure from Its Own Precedent 
As discussed above, if a suspect does not properly invoke his 
rights with a clear statement, the police may continue the 
interrogation. However, if the interrogation continues and the suspect 
makes inculpatory statements, the prosecution must still meet its 
burden to show that the suspect validly waived his rights before using 
his statements against him at trial.109 “The question whether a suspect 
has validly waived his right is ‘entirely distinct’ as a matter of law 
from whether he invoked that right.”110 In other words, even if a 
suspect fails to unambiguously invoke his right to silence and 
thereby terminate the interrogation, he must waive his right against 
self-incrimination before his statements may be used against him.111 
 
 105. Id. at 794. 
 106. Id. at 804. 
 107. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1994). 
 108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
 109. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010). 
 110. Id. at 2268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S 91, 98 (1984) 
(per curiam)). 
 111. Id. at 2260 (majority opinion). 
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As the Miranda Court held, the burden on the prosecution to 
show that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his 
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel is a 
heavy one.112 A central principle announced in the Miranda decision, 
which subsequent Supreme Court decisions have affirmed, is that “a 
valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the 
accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a 
confession was in fact eventually obtained.”113 Therefore, the fact 
that after a defendant has been read his rights he remains silent and 
does not immediately assert his rights is not sufficient to show that 
he has waived those rights. In other words, a suspect’s failure to 
immediately invoke his rights does not mean he has validly waived 
his rights. The decision in Butler, which held for the first time that a 
valid waiver need not be express but may be implied, echoed this 
principle.114 The Court held that mere silence will not be enough to 
support a finding of waiver, but that a suspect’s “silence, coupled 
with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct 
indicating waiver” may be sufficient to show implied waiver.115 
While the Butler Court may have retreated from the principle 
announced in Miranda that any waiver be “specifically made,”116 the 
majority was careful to reiterate that there still must be a 
presumption against waiver and that the prosecution’s burden to 
show waiver is great.117 Furthermore, the Court indicated that it did 
not intend for implied waiver to become the rule rather than the 
exception by emphasizing that only in some cases will waiver be 
clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person 
interrogated.118 
Purportedly relying on Butler’s implied-waiver rule, the 
Thompkins Court announced a new formulation of that rule: “Where 
the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it 
 
 112. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
 113. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; see, e.g., Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (reaffirming Miranda’s 
principle that silence alone is not enough to constitute a valid waiver). 
 114. See Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470. 
 117. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. 
 118. Id. 
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was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement 
establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”119 The 
Court couched its analysis in the Butler framework, but this new rule 
is in fact a striking departure from the precedent it professes to rely 
on. 
While the Butler Court did not give the lower courts any 
guidance for analyzing the circumstances in which words and actions 
would clearly imply waiver, the particular facts of Butler provide 
some guidance. In Butler, FBI agents gave the suspect a Miranda 
warning, and he stated that he understood his rights.120 The FBI 
agents informed him that he did not need to speak with them or sign 
the waiver-of-rights form but that they would like to speak with 
him.121 The suspect responded, “I will talk to you but I am not 
signing any form.”122 He clearly indicated a willingness to engage in 
a conversation with the police, which constituted a “course of 
conduct indicating waiver.”123 
Indeed, this course-of-conduct requirement has always required 
something more than merely giving an inculpatory response to police 
interrogators. Circuit courts and state courts alike have typically 
found implied waiver only when a suspect expresses a willingness to 
speak or readily engages in conversation with the police.124 In fact, 
the Fifth Circuit, in a factual situation similar to that in Thompkins, 
found no implied waiver because there had been no indication of any 
willingness to talk and the only statement that the suspect had made 
was the one being challenged.125 Notably, the court largely based its 
holding on the idea that “the making of the inculpatory statement 
 
 119. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010). 
 120. Butler, 441 U.S. at 370–71. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 371. 
 123. Id. at 373. 
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 384, 389–90 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding 
implied waiver when suspect initiated conversation with police and willingly answered 
questions); Stawicki v. Israel, 778 F.2d 380, 382–84 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding implied waiver 
when suspect asked to speak with the detective and then fully confessed to a murder); United 
States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that suspect’s willingness to 
answer questions and oral acknowledgement that she understood her rights was sufficient to show 
implied waiver); People v. Hawthorne, 205 P.3d 245, 260 (Cal. 2009) (finding implied waiver 
when defendant was “eager” to participate in police interrogation). 
 125. McDonald v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 518, 521–22 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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cannot alone indicate waiver.”126 
Under the particular facts of Thompkins, it is arguable that the 
suspect’s few one-word responses and sporadic eye contact 
throughout the three-hour interrogation indicated some willingness to 
speak with the police, and therefore perhaps implied a course of 
conduct indicating waiver. However, the Court’s analysis did not 
rely heavily on the sporadic answers Thompkins had given 
throughout the interrogation to reach the conclusion that 
Thompkins’s behavior showed a course of conduct indicating 
waiver. The Court found that “Thompkins’s answer to Detective 
Helgert’s question about whether Thompkins prayed to God for 
forgiveness for shooting the victim is a ‘course of conduct indicating 
waiver’ of the right to remain silent.”127 Therefore, the Court implied 
that a suspect engages in a course of conduct indicating waiver 
simply by making a one-word inculpatory statement. 
This conclusion is in complete derogation of the principle firmly 
announced in Miranda, reaffirmed in Butler, and even acknowledged 
in the Thompkins decision itself—that “a valid waiver will not be 
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are 
given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually 
obtained.”128 As almost an afterthought, the Court added that this 
conclusion is “confirmed” by the fact that Thompkins had given 
sporadic answers to questions throughout the interrogation.129 
Therefore, the Court seems to suggest that there is a valid waiver the 
minute an inculpatory statement is made, and any waiver-indicating 
conduct in addition to the inculpatory statement merely bolsters that 
conclusion but is not necessary to it. The Court supports its 
conclusory reasoning with the very general principle that when a 
suspect who, understanding his rights, acts in a manner inconsistent 
with the exercise of those rights, that suspect has made a deliberate 
choice to relinquish the protection of those rights.130 Therefore, 
because Thompkins knew that he had the right to remain silent, the 
one-word response elicited after two hours and forty-five minutes of 
 
 126. Id. at 522. 
 127. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. at 2261; Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
 129. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263. 
 130. Id. at 2262. 
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one-sided interrogation is conduct that is inconsistent with the 
exercise of that right, and therefore clearly indicates the deliberate 
relinquishment of its protections. 
Even if the Court did in fact rely on Thompkins’s sporadic 
statements as part of the course of conduct indicating waiver, further 
analysis of those statements’ nature reveals that reliance on them is 
misplaced. The only two actual statements Thompkins made were 
that he “didn’t want a peppermint” and that the chair he was “sitting 
in was hard.”131 These statements are completely unrelated to the 
offense for which he was being questioned. They do not relate to the 
shooting in any manner. It is anomalous to suggest that 
communication with the police about matters completely unrelated to 
the offense—and that are not possibly incriminating—indicates a 
willingness to waive one’s right against self-incrimination. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Miranda Court introduced a rule that gave broad protections 
for suspects against the inherently compelling nature of in-custody 
interrogations. The interrogators could not continue questioning a 
suspect if he asserted his rights “in any manner,” and if interrogation 
did continue, there was a “heavy burden” on the prosecution to show 
that a waiver had been “specifically made.” 
The cases that followed Miranda chipped away at these central 
principles. The Davis Court decided that a suspect must 
unambiguously assert his right to counsel to cut off questioning 
rather than being able to do so “in any manner.” The Butler Court 
held that waiver did not need to be “specifically made,” but could be 
implied through the defendant’s course of conduct. The Thompkins 
decision is no exception to this trend of retreating from Miranda’s 
broad principles. 
Today, a suspect’s persistent silence in the face of questioning 
will not invoke his right to remain silent and will not cut off 
questioning. Therefore a suspect may sit in an interrogation room—
saying nothing in response to repeated and persistent questioning by 
the police over a period of hours—and the interrogation can continue 
without pause. 
 
 131. Id. at 2257. 
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Furthermore, before Thompkins even if the defendant’s silence 
were not sufficient to invoke his right to remain silent, an extended 
period of silence might at least militate against a finding of implied 
waiver. After Thompkins, such silence is presumably irrelevant so 
long as the suspect at some point says something incriminating. If at 
hour three, a suspect’s silence is broken and he finally makes an 
inculpatory one-word response to the interrogator, he has 
deliberately relinquished his constitutional protections against self-
incrimination. The new rules announced in this decision directly 
undermine the original purpose of the Miranda warnings—to protect 
suspects against the coercive pressures of custodial interrogation. As 
Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent, “[r]equiring proof of a course 
of conduct beyond the inculpatory statements themselves is critical 
to ensuring that those statements are voluntary admissions and not 
the dubious product of an overborne will.”132 
 
 132. Id. at 2272–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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